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QUESTION PRESENTED
In this case petitioner Price Waterhouse was held to
have violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
because of its decision not to make respondent Hopkins
a partner in the firm. Although Price Waterhouse was
held to have established a legitimate, nondiscriminatory,
nonpretextual reason for that decision, the court of
appeals characterized the case as one involving ‘mixed
motives” for the employment decision because the firm’s
decisionmaking process included some unconscious and
unquantifiable measure of impermissible “sex stereo-
typing.” The court of appeals held, 2-1, that in such
a “mixed motive” case the plaintiff prevails unless the
defendant shows—and shows by clear and convincing
evidence—that impermissible bias was not a decisive
cause of the employmentdecision.
The question presented is whether the court of appeals
was in error in shifting the burden of persuasion on the
issue of intentional discrimination to the defendant, and
in defining that burden in accordance with the “clear
and convincing” standard, even though the district court
found that there existed a legitimate, nondiscriminatory,
and nonpretextual reason for the employment decision,
and even though there was no showing that discrimina-
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ANN B. HOPKINS, RESPONDENT
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit
BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-39a)
is reported at 825 F.2d 458. The opinion of the district
court (Gesell, D.J.) (Pet. App. 40a-62a) is reported at
618 F. Supp. 1109.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 63a-
64a) was entered on August 4, 1987, and a petition for
rehearing was denied on September 30, 1987 (Pet. App.
65a). On December 11, 1987, Chief Justice Rehnquist
extended the time for filing a petition for a writ of
certiorari to January 12, 1988, and the petition wasfiled
on that date. The petition was granted on March 7, 1988
(J.A. 83). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked




1. Introduction. This case raises the question whether
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2 et seqg., is violated in cases where the defendant
shows that it had a valid, nondiscriminatory reason for
the challenged employmentdecision and the plaintiff fails
to show by a preponderanceof the evidence that that rea-
son was a pretext and that the employment decision was
caused by a discriminatory motive.
A divided panel of the court of appeals (Edwards, J.,
and Joyce Hens Green, D.J., with Williams, J., dissent-
ing) held that Price Waterhouse violated Title VII when
it declined to make respondent, Ann B. Hopkins, a part-
ner in the firm. The court of appeals did not disturb
the district court’s factual finding that Price Waterhouse
had established a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and non-
pretextual basis for its decision not to make Hopkins
a partner, but it held that that showing was insufficient
to negate liability under Title VII because the process
by which Hopkins was considered for partnership may
have_included some unquantifiable measure of uncon-
scious “sex stereotyping.” Even though Hopkins pre-
sented no evidence of any individual or collective illicit
motivation on the part of any of the persons actually
responsible for making the partnership decision at Price
Waterhouse, the courtofappealscharacterized the case
as one involving “mixed motives” on the basis of the
testimony“expertin the field of [sex]
stereotyping” (Pet. App. 53a) who purported to see “sex
stereotyping” in some of the expressions used about Hop-
kins by a few individuals (none of them final decision-
makersin her case, and all but one of them supporters
of her partnership bid). It then held that in such “mixed
motives” cases (a) the defendant employer bears the
burden of proving that unlawful bias was not the deter-
minative factor in the challenged employment decision;





The court of appeals acknowledged (Pet. App. 22a)
that its ruling, that an employer allegedly actuated by
“mixed motives” must prove that intentional discrimina-
tion was not the determinative factor in its employment
decision, represents a departure from this Court’s alloca-
tion of the burden of proof in Title VII actions in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
and Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248 (1981). In Burdine, the Court stated that
“Tt]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact
that the defendant intentionally discriminated against
the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.”
450 U.S. at 253. Building on its decision in McDonnell
Douglas, the Court in Burdine established a “division of
intermediate evidentiary burdens” designed to resolve
the “ultimate question” of intentional discrimination that
a plaintiff must prove. 450 U.S. at 253. First, the plain-
tiff must show by a “preponderance of the evidence a
prima facie case of discrimination.” Ibid. The defend-
ant is then permitted to meet that preliminary showing
by “‘articulat[ing] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employee’s rejection.’” Jbid. (quoting
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). If the defendant
comes forward with such evidence, as Price Waterhouse
did in this case, the plaintiff must then attempt “to
demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true
reason for the employment decision.” Burdine, 450 U.S.
at 256. Only aplaintiff who makes such a showing by
a preponderance of the evidence will have successfully
carried her burden of proving that she was “the victim
of intentional discrimination.” Ibid. The imposition of
Title VII liability on Price Waterhouse, absent a show-
ing that discrimination was a “but for” cause e
adverse partnership decision, is inconsistent with Bur-
dine’s allocation to the plaintiff of this ultimate burden
of persuasion.
In addition to holding that the defendant in a “mixed
motives” case must bear the burden of proving that dis-   
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crimination wasnot a “but for” cause of its employment
decision, the court of appeals made two other rulings
that we challenge. First, the court of appeals erred
in characterizing this case as one involving “mixed mo-
tives,’ even though there was no palpable or substantial
evidence in the record that discrimination was a decisive
causal factor in Hopkins’ failure to make partner. Sec-
ond, the court erred in holding that the employer must
negative unlawful bias by the extraordinary standard of
“clear and convincing” evidence.
2. The Partnership Selection Process At Price Water-
house. Each year, new partners at Price Waterhouse are
selected from among the firm’s senior managers. The
“elaborate recommendation and review process” whereby
new partners are chosen (Pet. App. 41a) begins when
partners in local offices of the firm draft a written pro-
posal that a senior manager from their office be con-
sidered for partnership. These proposals are circulated
to all of the firm’s partners, who are invited to comment
on candidates by submitting a “long form” evaluation
if they have had “significant and recent contact with the
candidate” (ibid.) or a “short form” evaluation if their
contact has been more limited. See Def. Exh. 21, 22, &
23. The evaluation forms ask partners submitting com-
ments to rank each candidate relative to other candi-
dates recently considered for partnership against an “ex-
haustive list of relevant, neutral criteria,” including
practice development, technical expertise, interpersonal
skills, and participation in civic activities. Pet. App.
Ala-42a. The forms also ask the partners to indicate
whether they believe the candidate should be granted or
denied admission to the partnership, or held over for
consideration in a later year, and request a short ex-
planation of the recommendation made. Ibid.
The Admissions Committee of the firm’s governing
Policy Board reviews the entire file of each candidate,




views partners who have submitted comments to learn
more about the basis for their views and recommenda-
tions. The Admissions Committee, at a series of meet-
ings, then evaluates in depth all of the information on
each candidate, and makes a recommendation to the
Policy Board. If the Admissions Committee recommends
that a particular candidatebe rejected or “held,” it also
prepares a short memorandum summarizing the basis
for its recommendation. Pet. App. 42a.
The Policy Board reviews the recommendations of the
Admissions Committee and votes to include the candidate
on a firm-wide partnership ballot, to “hold” the candi-
date, or to reject the candidate. Candidates placed on the
ballot must be approved by a two-thirds vote of the en-
tire partnership. Candidates whom the Policy Board
votes to reject or to “hold” are informed of the reason
for the Policy Board’s decision.
3. The District Court’s Findings. In 1982, Hopkins
was proposed for admission to the Price Waterhouse
partnership by the partners in the Office of Government
Services (OGS) in Washington, D.C., where she had been
employed as a manager and then a senior managersince
1978. Def. Exh. 20. Thirty-two partners submitted
forms evaluating her candidacy. Of these, thirteen rec-
ommended that she be admitted to the partnership, eight
recommended that she be denied admission, three recom-
mended that she be “held” for consideration in a sub-
sequent year, and another eight stated that they lacked
a sufficient basis upon which to make a recommendation.
Pet. App. 48a. Many partners made comments about
Hopkins’ abrasive personality and poor interpersonal
skills, noting in particular her impatience, insensitivity,
and use of profanity in dealing with staff. Id. at 48a-
44a. As a result, the Admissions Committee recom-
mended that she be held “at least a year to afford time
to demonstrate that she has the personal and leadership
qualities required of a partner.” Id. at 44a (quoting Plf.
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Admissions Committee’s recommendation, and Hopkins
wasadvised of the basis for that decision. Pet. App. 44a."
By the time the annual partnership selection process
began again in 1983, two OGS partners had withdrawn
their earlier support for Hopkins. Hopkins’ advocates
within OGS concluded that reconsideration in the 1983
partnership selection cycle would therefore be in vain.
Accordingly, Hopkins was advised that OGS would not
repropose her for partnership. Although Hopkins was
told that she could remain as a senior manager, she re-
signed from the firm in January 1984. Pet. App. Ta.
Hopkins then initiated this action in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, claiming that
unlawful sex discrimination was the cause of both Price
Waterhouse’s initial decision to place her partnership
candidacy on hold and the subsequent decision of the
OGS partners not to repropose her for partnership in
the following year. (The latter allegation is not before
this Court, because the district court ruled that the deci-
1 At the time of trial in this case (March 1985), Price Water-
house had a total of 662 partners, seven of whom were women. Pet.
App. 4la, 43a. As of July 1, 1987, Price Waterhouse had a total of
805 partners, 17 of whom were women. Another 93 persons will be
admitted to the partnership effective July 1, 1988, seven of whom are
women. The district court rejected Hopkins’ claim that the al-
legedly small number of women partners at Price Waterhouseindi-
cated discrimination. The court noted that Hopkins’ “proof lacked
sufficient data on the number of qualified women available for
partnership * * *. Women haveonly recently entered the accounting
and related fields in large numbers and there is evidence that many
potential women partners were hired away from Price Waterhouse
by clients and rival accounting firms.” Jd. at 50a-51a.
Hopkins was the only woman in her partnership “class” of 88
candidates, the successful members of which became partnerseffec-
tive July 1, 1983. Forty-seven of the 88 candidates were admitted
to the partnership, 20 candidates (Hopkins and 19 men) wereheld
for consideration in a later year, and the remaining 21 men were
rejected outright. Pet. App. 5a. As these figures show, typically
about half of the candidates proposed in any year are admitted to
the partnership, and the other half divide between those who are




sion not to repropose Hopkins was not discriminatory
(Pet. App. 48a), and Hopkins did not appeal that deter-
mination.) In response, Price Waterhouse showed that
| during her five-year period of employment with the firm
’ Hopkins’ abrasive personality and poor interpersonal
| skills created grave problems, and made it particularly
’ difficult for employees subject to her supervision to work
harmoniously with her. The district court accepted this
showing, agreeing with Price Waterhouse that Hopkins
“had considerable problems dealing with staff and peers.”
Id. at 59a. Indeed, after carefully examining Hopkins’
employment history at Price Waterhouse, the district
court found that both “[s]upporters and opponents of
her candidacy indicated that [Hopkins] was sometimes
| overly aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to work with
| and impatient with staff.” Id. at 43a-44a. The district
court concluded that the complaints about Hopkins’
“interpersonal skills were not fabricated as apretext for
discrimination” and that Hopkins’ “conduct provided am-
ple justification for the complaints that formed the basis
of the Policy Board’s decision” that her partnership can-
didacy should be postponed for at least one year. Id. at
46a-47a.
There was overwhelming evidence before the district
court to support these findings and conclusions. Hopkins
herself testified that she was “abrasive,” “candid,” and
“hard driving” (Tr. 41, 44-45), and characterized her-
self as “a bitch” during a major project (Tr. 109). Staff
who had worked under Hopkins described her behavior
in strong terms. One consultant described Hopkins’ man-
: ner toward him as “abrupt” and “insensitive” (Tr. 363).
He testified that “it was tough dealing with Ann and
| I don’t think that I’ve had that type of same tough ex-
r perience prior to or after” working for her (Tr. 371).
| Another employee (who testified on Hopkins’ behalf)
| indicated that “it required ‘diplomacy, patience and guts’
| to work with her” (Pet. App. 46a, quoting Tr. 434).
And one consultant actually quit the firm in part because
| he could not tolerate working with her (Tr. 193-194),   ——___-—_—— |
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citing an incident in which Hopkins had screamed ob-
scenities at him for 45 minutes (Tr. 193).
There was evidence too that Hopkins had a “con-
descending attitude[]” toward the staff assigned to her
projects (Tr. 351). Working for her was “demeaning
at times” (Tr. 363), and one consultant testified that
he felt Hopkins “looked down upon” him (Tr. 364).
Some staff members called Hopkins “Queen Ann” because
of her “regal bearing” toward them (Tr. 164). Hopkins
gave a particularly clear indication of the low regard she
had for the employees working under her when, during
a lunch with some partners in 1981, she launched a
vitriolic attack on staff members. This so angered the
partners present that they cut the lunch short. The in-
cident was described by OGS partner Thomas Beyer,
Hopkins’ strongest supporter in the firm:
Ann and I and Lew Krulwich, one of our partners,
* * * went off to lunch together. * * * [A]nd we were
eating and just kind of passing time as our lunch—
and something happened to Ann. I wasn’t quite sure
what. But she began to—began to criticize a num-
ber of the people in theoffice at different levels. In
different fashions. At first I passed it off thinking
well, this is, this is Ann. She’s probably tired. I
couldn’t—I really didn’t have much regard for it.
But Ann kept up with it. Lew was silent and—not
saying anything and Ann kept on talking * * *.
And it got more vitriolic. More striking. And after
awhile I began to get quite angry * * *. At that
point, Lew, kind of trying to settle the situation,
said, look, let’s quit and go back to work. Wewalked
back in silence and I went off to my office still quite
angry that Ann had donethis.
Tr. 197-197A. Later that afternoon, Beyer told Hopkins
that “you’re making it extremely difficult for me if you
keep this up to try to develop an image, an awareness
that you are in fact a fine partner candidate in the firm.
How do I convey that message to the partners in the
firm when you have outbursts like this, unprovoked as
far as I can tell, and certainly questionable.” Tr. 198.








Hopkins’ handling of staff work assignments also re-
flected insensitivity and lack of concern for subordinates.
Her management style was one of “perpetual crisis,”
and if she could not convince the staff that there was
a crisis, “she [would] go out and create one” (Tr. 327-
328). She created “chaos” among staff (Tr. 364) by
assigning “unstructured, almost trial and error” tasks
(Def. Exh. 25;? see also Tr. 273), giving so little direc-
tion that the work would have to be done over and over
again (Tr. 364-365). The staff “resented [ Hopkins’ ]
relationship with them” (Tr. 164), and became “frus-
trat[ed]” (Tr. 365) and “somewhat alienated” (Tr.
367; see also Def. Exh. 31).
Though Hopkins by most accounts had good technical
skills and was accepted by clients once they “adjusted to
her hard driving style and no-nonsense approach” (as
her most enthusiastic supporter put it) (Def. Exh. 9),
her abrupt and abrasive manner and her insensitivity
and condescension toward employees caused problems
throughout her tenure at Price Waterhouse. Beyer, the
partner in charge of OGS, testified that he heard com-
plaints about her relations with staff almost from the
day he transferred from the Bostonoffice to OGS in 1979.
Tr. 163-164. Consistently, in evaluations of her work
and in formal counseling sessions, partners detailed prob-
lems in the way Hopkins dealt with staff and urged her
to correct those problems. As the district court found,
Hopkins “[a]t the time * * * indicated that she agreed
with manyof these criticisms” (Pet. App. 46a). The evi-
dence showed that she nevertheless continued to be abra-
sive and difficult to work for.
An annual performancereview of Hopkins’ work dur-
ing 1979-80 stated that in order to enhance her “partner-
ship potential, [Hopkins] must improve her interpersonal
 
2 We are lodging with the Court copies of Defendant’s Exhibits
7, 9, 11, 18, 14, 15, 17, 24, 25, 27, 30, 31, and 37 and Plaintiff’s
Exhibits 12, 13, 14, 15, 17 (last two pages), and 37. These exhibits
contain handwritten notes and other material that could not be




skills’ (Def. Exh. 7). This theme recurred repeatedly
in evaluations of Hopkins’ work. Her deficiencies with
respect to “relationships within the office’ were the “pri-
mary focus,” for example, of her 1981 counseling session
(Def. Exh. 11). During that session, the importance of
interpersonal skills in the evaluation of candidates for
partnership was emphasized, and Hopkins agreed that
it was important that she make progress in that area
(ibid.). Nonetheless, Hopkins was told at her 1982
counseling session that she remained “overly assertive,”
intolerant, impatient, and insensitive to staff develop-
ment (Def. Exh. 17); and in various reports on her
work made during 1982, partners stated that Hopkins
was “overly critical” (Def. Exh. 14), needed to become
‘more sensitive to others” (Def. Exh. 24), and needed to
“demonstrate people skills’ (Def. Exh. 25). Following
Hopkins’ work on a project in Price Waterhouse’s St.
Louis office, one partner there wrote that “[dlealing ef-
fectively and motivationally with staff is Ann’s primary
apparent weakness,” and “the one area where Ann needs
to show improvement to become a partner” (ibid.).
Another partner was moved to report that Hopkins ap-
proached the St. Louis project as if it were a“fire drill”
and “alienated almost everyone who worked on [it]”
(Def. Exh. 31). As a consequence, “[n]o one want[ed]
to work with her” in the future (<bid.).
This substantial history of severely strained relations
with staff was a major focus of the comments made
about Hopkins by partners who completed long or short
form evaluations when she was considered as a partner-
ship candidate. These negative comments were not lim-
ited to partners who opposed her candidacy. One of her
early supporters, OGS partner Donald Epelbaum, wrote
that Hopkins could “be abrasive, unduly harsh, difficult
to work with &, as a result, cause[d] significant turmoil”
(Def. Exh. 27), while other supporters commented that
she was “a ‘tough cookie’”’ (ibid., Hart) who was “some-
eo lacking in the congeniality dept.” (ibid., Powell),




staff” (ibid., Beyer). Moreover, even those partners who |
considered their contacts with Hopkins insufficient to
make a judgment as to whether she should becomea part- I
ner were able to comment on her interpersonal skills, |
] showing that this problem pervaded Hopkins’ entire
situation at Price Waterhouse. These partners, although
, they had less frequent contact with Hopkins, reported
that in their experience she was “weak in interpersonal
skills” (ibid., Johnson), “arrogan[t] & self-centered”
(cbid., Haller), “abrasive” (ibid., Hartz), and “ex-
tremely overbearing” (ibid., Green).
Among those who did not favor making Hopkins a
partner, one partner had concluded that she was “poten-_
tially dangerous” (Def. Exh. 27, Statland), and another
Taterchanged his mind and supported Hopkins)
thought she had shown herself capable of “abus[ing]
authority” if she were to become a partner (ibid., Cof-
fey). Others making “no” or “hold” recommendations
noted that Hopkins was “universally disliked” by staff
(ibid., Everett), who didtofor her
(abid., Fridley, Statland, and Coffey), and that she was
“consistently annoying and irritating” (ibid., Hoffman),
“unpleasant” (ibid., Whelan), and “very abrasive”
(2bid., Blythe).
The evidence outlined above demonstrates that, far
from being generated by sexist biases, these comments
were simply accurate reports about Hopkins. That is
why the district court found that these complaints were
justified by the evidence. The central question about
Hopkins’ suitability for partnership at Price Waterhouse
was epitomized by the partner who asked whether her
“personality [would] limit her ability to successfully
market work, retain staff & maintain satisfactory rela-
tions with her [partners]” (Def. Exh. 27, Hartz). The
evidence provides ample support for the Policy Board’s
reservations.
In addition to finding that. Hopkins’ behavior provided
good grounds for the various negative comments made in
the partnership evaluation forms, the district court also  
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rejected Hopkins’ attempt, based on a comparison of her
file with those of similarly situated men, to show that
Price Waterhouse treated ifferentlyfromm male can-
didates with overly aggressive or abrasive personalities.
At the same time, however, the district court believed
that some of the negative characterizations about Hop-
kins’ foul language, arrogance, and impatience—e.g.,
that she needed to take a “course at charm school” (Def.
Exh. 27, Hoffman) —reflected “unconscious” (Pet. App.
54a) but “discriminatory [sex] stereotyp[ing].” Jd. at
57a. Still, the district court balanced this evidence
against the record of acknowledged “deficiencies” in
Hopkins’ performance (id. at 46a). At the end of the
day, the district court found, Hopkins had proven only
that sex stereotyping “played an undefined role in block-
ing [her] admission to the partnership.” Id. at 54a
(emphasis added). Because of this inconclusive showing
by Hopkins, the district court found,
the Court cannot say that [Hopkins] would have
been elected to partnership if the Policy Board’s de-
cision had not been tainted by sexually biased eval-
uations.
Id. at 59a.









| establish that she would have made partner even in the
absence of any sexual stereotyping or that such conduct
was actually a motivating factor in Price Waterhouse’s
decision. Indeed, the district court did not find even
“yneonscious” stereotyping on the part of any person at
Price Waterhouse responsible for actually making the
relevant decision about Hopkins.
Nevertheless, the district court found that Title VII
was violated. The violation was deemed to arise from
the confluence of three factors, none of which the court
thought was discriminatory standing alone. First,
“TeJomments influenced”—albeit unconsciously—“by sex






the firm’s evaluation process gave substantial weight
to these comments; and [third,] the partnership
failed to address the conspicuous problem of stereo-
typing in partnership evaluations. While these three
factors might have been innocent alone, they com-
bined to produce discrimination in the case of this
plaintiff.
Pet. App. 58a. In short, Price Waterhouse was found
liable because, “[dJespite the fact that the comments on
women candidates often suggested that the male evalua-
tors may have been influenced by a sex bias, the Policy
Board never addressed the problem.” Jd. at 55a.
The defendant’s liability was thus not predicated upon
an employment decision shown to have been made on
the basis of gender; the district court did not find that
discrimination caused Hopkins’ rejection. Rather, Price
Waterhouse was found to have committed an intentional
violation of Title VII because it failed to counteract the
unconscious sexism that Hopkins’ expert read into ioly
aicolloquialisms of some of Hopkins’ colleagues—none of
them the ultimate decisionmakers—who had commented
on her performance in the course of the evaluation
process.
The district court’s imposition of liability, notwith-
standing its failure to find that Hopkins’ rejection was
caused by discrimination, is particularly troubling be-
cause of the way in which the existence of even “un-
conscious” sex stereotyping was divined. The district
court’s insight into these unconscious elements of Price
Waterhouse’s partnership decisionmaking process came
primarily from the testimony of Dr. Susan Fiske, de-
scribed by the district court as “a well qualified expert”
in the “field of stereotyping.” Pet. App. 58a. Although
Dr. Fiske had never met Hopkins, and made no inquiry
whatever into the facts of Hopkins’ actual performance
at Price Waterhouse, her review of the written comments
made by Price Waterhouse partners about Hopkins’ per-
formance enabled her to opine that the partners’ nega-
tive statements about Hopkins were caused by sexual  
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stereotypes rather than the reality that they accurately
described. Dr. Fiske purported to find sex stereotyping
in comments that Hopkins was “overbearing,” “arro-
gant,” “self-centered,” and “abrasive,” and that Hopkins
“r[an] over people’ and wasdisliked by staff (J.A. 60).
Dr. Fiske reached this conclusion by simply excluding
from her consideration the actual evidence of Hopkins’
behavior, evidence that persuaded even the district court
that Hopkins’ “conduct provided ample justification for
the complaints” about her. Pet. App. 46a-47a. Here is
a typical exchange:
Q. * * * Some of these folks describe Miss Hopkins,
as you have read back to me, as overbearing, arro-
gant, self-centered, abrasive, thinks she knows more
than anyone in the universe, and potentially danger-
ous. Would you think it would be somehow a stereo-
typical decision to exclude such a person from the
partnership if that was in fact true?
A. I am not qualified to say whether or not it is
true * * * [blecause I didn’t observe her behavior.
J.A. 64.
As Judge Williams, dissenting below, observed, Dr.
Fiske’s approach means that “if an observer character-
ized someone as ‘overbearing and arrogant and abrasive
and running over people,’ an expert such as Dr. Fiske
could discern * * * that [those comments] stemmed
from unconscious stereotypes * * * without meeting the
subject of the comment or making any inquiry into a
possible factual basis.” Pet. App. 36a. Further, Dr.
Fiske found forbidden motives even in the comments of
partners who supported Hopkins’ partnershipbid, testi-
fying that their favorable comments were efforts “to
overcome their stereotypical attitudes.” Jd. at 18a n.3
(citing Tr. 565 (J.A. 42)). It seems clear, therefore,
that on this approach “no woman could be overbearing,
arrogant or abrasive: any observations to that effect
would necessarily be discounted as the product of stereo-
typing. If analysis like this is to prevail in federal








a woman on such attributes.” Pet. App. 36a (Williams,
J., dissenting) .
4, The Court Of Appeals’ Decision. A divided panel
of the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s find-
ing of liability as well as the theory upon which it was
based. The court expressly recognized that the causation
issue was at the center of the case. Noting the split
among the circuits as to where the burden of proof
should be placed (Pet. App. 20a-21a & n.8), the court of
appeals rejected Price Waterhouse’s cross-appeal only
“{b]ecause Price Waterhouse could not demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that impermissible bias
was not the determinative factor” (id. at 25a). Price
Waterhouse was held to have violated Title VII solely
on the basis of the amorphous proposition that “stereo-
typical attitudes towards women had manifested them-
selves in connection with the partnership bids of other
women and * * * that these stereotypes had been
brought to bear on [Hopkins’] candidacy” (id. at 20a)—
even though Hopkins had not proved that she would have
been made a partner in the absence of stereotyping.
Indeed, the court of appeals expressly refused to require
Hopkins to make any such showing. Assigning to Title
VII plaintiffs the burden of proof on each element of
their cases, including causation, the court held, would
“place an enormous, perhaps insurmountable, burden on
Title VII litigants” (ibid.). Instead, the court of appeals
shifted the burden to Price Waterhouse to negate by
“clear and convincing” evidence a fact that the court
acknowledged was “impossible to measure.” Pet. App.
Oa.
 
3 In addition, the court of appeals reversed the district court and
held that the decision of the OGS partners not to repropose
Hopkins for partnership in 1983 constituted a “constructive dis-
charge.” Accordingly, the court remanded the case for further
proceedings on the question of remedy. Pet. App. 25a-28a. Those





In dissent, Judge Williams agreed that the central is-
sue on appeal was causation, but observed that “the rec-
ord here provided no causal connection between Hopkins’s
fate and such stereotyping as went on among Price
Waterhouse’s 662 partners.” Pet. App. 29a.* Judge Wil-
liams also was troubled by Dr. Fiske’s impressive claim
that she was “able to find forbidden stereotyping simply
by reading partners’ comments—without information
about the truth of the matters commented upon.” Id. at
36a. Finally, Judge Williams objected to the majority’s
4As Judge Williams noted, “[t]he only remark by a Hopkins
opponent that can becharacterized as manifesting sexual stereo-
typing is the facetious suggestion that she should take a ‘course
at charm school.’ The smoke from this gun seems to me rat
her
wispy. It was embedded in the following comment:
Contacts with Ann are only casual—several mtgs at OGS and
MMGSsessions. However, she is consistently annoying and
irritating—believes she knows more than anyone about any-
thing, is not afraid to let the world know it. Suggest a course
at charm school before she is considered for admission. I
would be embarrassed to introduce her as aptnr.”
Pet. App. 33a (emphasis added). The majority was able to f
ind
evidence of sex stereotyping in the “charm school” remark only
by
resorting to Webster’s definition, not of that term, but of the te
rm
“fmishing school.” See id. at 13a n.4. But Webster’s defines ‘cha
rm
school” in sex-neutral terms, stating simply that it is “a school
in
which social graces are taught.” Webster’s Third New Intern
a-
tional Dictionary 378 (1986). The majority did not explain why
it
would be discriminatory for Price Waterhouse to insist that all
of
its partners, male and female, be schooled in the “social graces
.”
In her Brief in Opposition, Hopkins never mentioned the “charm
school” remark as evidence of discrimination. Instead, she be-
labored a single comment made by Thomas Beyer, her strongest
supporter. See Br. in Opp. 3, 4, 6, 7. Hopkins testified that after
her partnership candidacy had been placed on “hold,” Beyer advised
her to “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more fe-
mininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”
_ Pet. App. 52a (citing Tr. 102, 316). The record is clear that Bey
er’s
advice was an entirely personal reaction to Hopkins’ situation and
gives no probative insight into the reasons for her rejection. See
Ty, 87-95, 168, 212-218. As Judge Williams correctly recognized in
dissent (Pet. App. 31a-32a), the record provides absolutely no sup-





willingness to find that the mere presence of stereotyping
would result in Title VII liability unless the employer
undertook “to institute special programs for sensitizing
partners to sex stereotyping, or otherwise to stampit out
of the evaluation process.” Jd. at 37a. Judge Williams
suggested that,
f [i]f such an omission is to groundliability, perhaps
the plaintiff should bear an initial burden of demon-
strating that gender stereotyping was more probably
than not the cause of the adverse employment
decision. * * *
From the facts here, it looks as though the duty
to sensitize has a hair trigger. The implications are
serious. The moredelicate the trigger, the more com-
pletely this court has dropped the requirement of in-
tentional discrimination out of the law. * * * The
rule turns Title VII from a prohibition of discrim-




This Court has held that the burden of persuasion in
Title VII disparate treatment cases remains at all times
with the plaintiff. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. The court
of appeals’ decision contravenes that principle in at least
three ways. First, the court’s decision requires the de-
fendant in so-called “mixed motives” cases to prove that
discrimination did not cause the adverse employment de-
cision, rather than requiring the plaintiff to prove that,
absent unlawful discrimination, she would have been
hired or promoted. Second, even if it is appropriate to
relieve the plaintiff of the ultimate burden of persuasion
on the question of causation in some circumstances, the
court of appeals erred by requiring the defendant to
make its showing by “clear and convincing” evidence.
Third, the courtappeals improperly evaded the hold-
ing of Burdine by characterizing this case as one of
“mixed motives” on the basis of intuitions about un-
conscious sexism—discernible only through an “expert”






dence in the case—that was not shown to have had a
causal impact on the disputed employment decision.
The net effect of the court of appeals’ decision is to place
an extraordinary and unjustified burden on an employer,
even where there exists overwhelming evidence of a legi-
timate, nondiscriminatory, and nonpretextual basis for its
refusal to promote a Title VII plaintiff.
1. The necessary starting point for analyzing this case
is the substantive standard of Title VII liability that
Congress created. The express language of Title VII,
prohibiting discriminatory actions taken because of a
plaintiff’s sex (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1)), and specify-
ing that Title VII relief may not be granted if the em-
ployment decision was made “for any reason other than
discrimination on account of * * * sex” (42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g)), as well as the statute’s history, make it
unmistakably clear that Title VII is violated only when
an employment decision was in fact caused by a pro-
hibited motive. Title VII does not make unlawful the
mere presence of discriminatory thoughts and expres-
sions, if those thoughts and expressions did not play a
decisive role in the challenged employment decision.
Thus, quite apart from burden of proof, the substantive
standard of liability under Title VII is the “but for’
standard; Title VII has not been violated if the employ-
ment decision would have been the same even in the
absence of any allegedly unlawful motive.
In light of this substantive standard, allocating the
burden of persuasion is not difficult. This Court’s prior
Title VII decisions uniformly dictate that it is the plain-
tiff who always bears the ultimate burden of persuasion
on the issue of causation. See, e.g., Burdine, 450 U.S. at
253; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805. In all Title
VII disparate treatment cases in which the employer
proffers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employment decision, the crucial inquiry on the question
of causation occurs at the third and final stage of the
Burdine analysis, where the plaintiff must “prove by a





sonsoffered by the defendant were not its true reasons.”
450 U.S. at 253.
With virtually no supporting precedent, the court of
appeals here discarded the essential third stage of the
Burdine framework, claiming that it was inapplicable
in so-called “mixed motives” cases. See Pet. App. 22a.
Instead, the court of appeals held that, in such cases,
the employer must meet the heavy burden of proving
the negative proposition that “impermissible bias was
not the determinative factor’ in its decision. Jd. at 25a
(emphasis added). But the court failed to explain why
characterizing a case as one involving “mixed motives”
justifies such a radical departure from the rules already
established by this Court for resolution of the ultimate
question of causation. Irrespective of whether a case
can be said to involve “mixed motives,’ Burdine’s hold-
ing that the plaintiff retains the “ultimate burden of
persuading the court that she has been the victim of
intentional discrimination” (450 U.S. at 256) precludes
a Title VII defendant from being saddled with the bur-
den of persuasion on the question of causation. See also
Bd. of Trustees v. Sweeney, 489 U.S. 24, 25 (1978)
(per curiam) (defendant in Title VII case may not be
required to prove absence of discriminatory motive).
2. The court of appeals not only switched the ultimate
burden of persuasion on the question of causation from
the plaintiff to the defendant; it further held that the
defendant must meet that burden by the extraordinary
standard of “clear and convincing” evidence. In rare
and compelling circumstances this Court has been will-
ing to impose the “clear and convincing” standard on
plaintiffs who seek the courts’ aid in imposing sanctions
or duties on a defendant; but subjecting a defendant to
coercion by a court order unless it disproves the plain-
tiff’s allegations by “clear and convincing” evidence is
wholly unprecedented. In the absence of any indication
from Congress that it intended such a substantial depar-
ture from the traditional rules of the legal system, this
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aspect of the court of appeals’ decision cannot be allowed
to stand.
3. The burden-shifting rule imposed by the court of
appeals has no legitimate place whatever in Title VII
disparate treatment cases. But it is in any event un-
justified in this case, because this case should never have
been characterized as a “mixed motives” case at all.
Here, the only indication of the existence of “mixed
motives” was the gossamer evidence provided by Dr.
Fiske, an “expert” in the field of “sex stereotyping,”
who purported to find stereotyping in some of the ex-
pressions used about Hopkins in the written evaluations
of her performance. But Dr. Fiske had never met Hop-
kins, had never met any of the Price Waterhouse part-
ners whose comments about Hopkins she was charac-
terizing, and knew nothing whatever of Hopkins’ actual
behavior at Price Waterhouse. Indeed, Dr. Fiske was
able to conclude that “sex stereotyping” played a part
in the employment decision only by excluding from con-
sideration all of the actual facts of Hopkins’ perform-
ance at Price Waterhouse—facts that showed that the
partners’ chosen words, far from reflecting stereotypic
thinking, accurately described the reality of Hopkins’
behavior.
If evidence such as Dr. Fiske’s is sufficient to trans-
form a case into one involving “mixed motives” for the
employment decision, then virtually any case can be so
labeled. Burdine’s rule—that the plaintiff must prove
that intentional discrimination caused her injury—will
simply disappear in a sea of findings of “mixed motives”
that are wholly lacking in concrete evidentiary support.
At a minimum,therefore, this Court should rule that the
court of appeals’ burden-shifting rule may not bein-
voked in the absence of a substantial, concrete basis in
the record to support a finding that the legitimate rea-
son offered by the employer was not the “true reason”
for its decision. Applying that standard here, it is clear






TITLE VII IS NOT VIOLATED IN THE ABSENCE OF
PROOF BY THE PLAINTIFF THAT THE CHAL-
LENGED EMPLOYMENT DECISION WAS CAUSED
BY INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION
A. A Title VII Plaintiff May Prevail Only By Showing
That Forbidden Discrimination Was A “But For”
Cause Of The Challenged Employment Decision.
1. As A Matter Of Substantive Law, Title VII Is Not
Violated Unless Discrimination Is A “But For”
Cause Of The Challenged Employment Decision.
The ultimate question for this Court in this case is:
who has the burden of persuasion on the question of why
Hopkins was not promoted to partner.> But behind this
issue lies an antecedent substantive question: apart from
burdens of proof, what relationship must exist between
arguably discriminatory thoughts and expressions, on the
one hand, and the challenged employment decision, on the
other, for Title VII to have been violated? Does Title VII
make illegal the existence of discriminatory thoughts and
expressions, if these do not come into play as a decisive
reason for an employment decision? As a matter of sub-
stantive law, if a failure to promote or adischarge would
have occurred in any event, even in the absence of dis-
criminatory thoughts and expressions, has Title VII been
violated?
Webelieve that the necessary starting point for ana-
lyzing this case is a clear understanding that the answer
to these questions is unequivocally “no.” Title VII does
not prohibit discrimination “in the air.” It has been vio-
lated only if the discrimination was a “but for” cause
5 Because Hopkins alleged that she was treated differently from
male partnership candidates, this case is one involving a claim of
“disparate treatment” and not of “disparate impact.” This Court
has made it clear that issues of proof in these two types of cases
are governed by different rules. See, e.g., United States Postal






of an adverse employment decision. If that decision
would have been made in any event, because it was based
on a valid, nondiscriminatory, nonpretextual reason, Title
VII has not been violated.
The court of appeals in this case apparently accepted
this bedrock proposition, although it did not use the “but
for’ terminology. The court discussed at length the
various formulas that have been adopted by the lower
courts to determine the substantive standard of causation
applicable in Title VII cases. Pet. App. 20a-23a. The
court noted that some courts have adopted a “but for”
standard, while other courts have used different verbal
formulas.® In the end, the court of appeals held that the
crucial issue was whether or not unlawful discrimination
was “the determinative factor” in the employment deci-
sion. Pet. App. 25a."
Congress was of course aware, when it enacted Title
VII, that multiple motives could exist in the workplace
6 See, e.g., McQuillen v. Wisconsin Education Ass’n Council, 830
F.2d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1068 (1988)
(“but for” standard); Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d
910, 915 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892 (1984) (same);
Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 875-876 (11th Cir. 1985)
(“same decision” test); Whiting v. Jackson State University, 616
F.2d 116, 121 (5th Cir. 1980) (“significant factor” test) (emphasis
in original) ; Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703, 712 (6th
Cir. 1985) (plaintiff must show employment decision “more likely
than not motivated by”illicit factor); Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d
1318, 1323 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (enough if illicit factor played
“some part” in decision).
7 At least one court has held that there is a substantive difference
between the court of appeals’ formula in this case (‘“‘the determina-
tive factor’) and the traditional “but for” test. See Lewis, 725
F.2d at 916-918. Undoubtedly, increased clarity would result if a
single verbal formula were used for the substantive standard of
causation in Title VII cases, and, because of its long usage, the
“but for” formula would serve this purpose better than any other.
In the interest of clarity and consistency, therefore, we use the
“but for” formula in this brief to mean that, even absent discrimi-





and possibly have an impact on employment decisions.
But it authorized government intervention only where
specific actions were in fact caused by discriminatory
intent on the part of employers. If unlawful discrimina-
tion was not the decisive factor—if the employment deci-
sion would have been identical even where discriminatory
motives and expressions are wholly absent—there can be
no violation of Title VII.
The language and history of Title VII make it quite
clear that Congress’s goal of assuring equality of employ-
ment opportunities was not to be achieved by sacrificing
the employer’s traditional right to make bona fide em-
ployment decisions based on legitimate, job-related, non-
discriminatory factors. As the Seventh Circuit has re-
cently held, the express language of “Title VII contains
a clear causal requirement between discriminatory moti-
vation and the challenged employment decision.” McQuil-
len V. Wisconsin Education Ass’n Council, 880 F.2d 659,
664 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1068 (1988).
The statute provides that it is unlawful for an employer
“to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual’s * * * sex” (42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (emphasis added)). Further,
Title VII expressly prohibits courts from requiring “the
hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as
an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if
such individual was refused * * * employment or ad-
vancement * * * for any reason other than discrimina-
tion on account of * * * sew” (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(emphasis added) ). The statute thus makes it clear that
it is not enough that discriminatory thoughts were pre-
sent in the atmosphere or that discrimination was “
factor” in the challenged employment decision. It must
be a factor that made a difference. If the employment
decision would have been adverseto the plaintiff in any
event, then the plaintiff was not discriminated against
because of her sex; instead, she was refused “employment






on account of” her sex. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (1),
5(g) (emphasis added).
A review of the legislative history makes it clear that
Congress simply asswmed that it was prohibiting dis-
crimination that caused unfavorable employment deci-
sions. For example, Representative Celler stated that
“[t]he law provides that an act can be only unlawfulif
it is discriminatory on the basis of race, color, creed, sex,
or national origin. * * * You can discriminate on any
grounds, but you can’t discriminate on [illicit] grounds.”
Hearing on H. Res. 789 Before the House Comm. on
Rules, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1964).° The following
exchange also is illustrative (110 Cong. Rec. 7257
(1964) ):
Mr. ERVIN. I want those who are engaged in
business to be allowed to determine whom they shall
employ. They are far better qualified than the Fed-
eral Government to know theskills they are seeking
to obtain for their business.
* *% * * *
® Much of the legislative history of Title VII was developed dur-
ing debate on H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). As originally
introduced, Title VII of H.R. 7152 would have prohibited discrimi-
nation only on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin.
During debate, however, the House adopted an amendment extend-
ing the coverage of Title VII to sex discrimination as well. 110
Cong. Rec. 2584 (1964). This change was retained by the Senate
when it substituted its own version of the bill. Id. at 14239. Al-
though the Senate substitute made some major changes in the
legislation, it effected nosignificant revisions to the Houseversion
of what became 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (1) and 2000e-5(g). The
Senate substitute was accepted by the House without change when
the House passed H. Res. 789, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). See 110
Cong. Rec. 15969 (1964).
Representative Celler’s views are entitled to special weight in
light of his role as Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee
that considered and held hearings on H.R. 7152. See, e.g., United
States v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., 247 U.S. 310, 8318 (1918) ; New York
State Dep’t of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 481 n.11
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Similarly, Senator Case, whose
views are noted above, served as one of the Bipartisan Captains









Mr. CASE. The Senator from North Carolina
knows that * * * the bill provides only that such a
decision could not be made on the ground of the
color of a man’s skin or his national origin or his
creed. * * * [T]he bill would take effect only when
the employer had knowingly discriminated against
an employee or a prospective employee because of
race, color of the skin, creed, or national origin * * *.
The origins of Section 2000e-5(g) are particularly
revealing. As originally introduced, H.R. 7152 prohibited
a court from granting relief if an “individual was * * *
refused employment or advancement or was suspended
or discharged for cause” (H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. 77 (1964) (emphasis added) ). In debate on the
bill, the phrase “for cause” was deleted and replaced
with the more specific and peremptory language that now
appears in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), prohibiting relief
whenever an employer acts “for any reason other than”
a prohibited reason. See 110 Cong. Rec. 2567-2571
(1964) (emphasis added). Representative Celler’s speech
introducing this amendment makes it clear that the pur-
pose of this section was to make the remedial provisions
of the bill congruent with its substantive provisions and
that the latter limited the act to situations where dis-
crimination caused an unfavorable employment decision
(id. at 2567):
Mr. Chairman, the purpose of the amendmentis to
specify cause. Here the court, for example, cannot
find any violation of the act which is based on facts
other—and I emphasize “other’—than discrimina-
tion on the grounds of race, color, religion, or na-
tional origin. The discharge might be based, for ex-
ample, on incompetence or a morals charge or theft,
but the court can only consider charges based on
race, color, religion, or national origin. That is the
purpose of this amendment.
The same theme was echoed by Representative Gill,
who explained that the purpose of the amendment was
“to pinch down the orders that can be issued by the court
 









to a more narrow range. Thus, we would not interfere
with discharges for ineptness, or drunkeness. * * * We
would limit orders under this act to the purposes of this
act.” 110 Cong. Rec. 2570 (1964) (emphasis added).
The history of Section 2000e-5(g) thus demonstrates that
“but for” causation is essential, as a matter of substan-
tive law, to any finding of a violation of the statute.
That the “but for” standard of causation is the correct
test under Title VII is not surprising, because that test
is the conventional civil law rule. Formulations less
stringent than the “but for” test “in effect * * * dis-
pense with proof of anything more than a possible causal
connection” between a discriminatory motive and the
challenged decision. H.L.A. Hart & T. Honore, Causation
in the Law liti (2d ed. 1985) (emphasis in original).
As such, they would result in the imposition of liability
on account of perceived “discrimination in the air”’—
because of vague notions of “societal discrimination” that
have not been shown to have harmed the plaintiff di-
rectly. This Court has repeatedly refused to adopt such
a standard. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267, 274 (1986) (opinion of Powell, J.) ; Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307-308
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). See also Fields v. Clark
University, 817 F.2d 931, 935 (1st Cir. 1987) (proof
that “the [challenged] decision was infected with dis-
crimination” does not necessarily entitle the plaintiff to
relief).
On the one occasion that it has addressed the substan-
tive standard of causation in Title VII cases, this Court
adopted the “but for” test, albeit without extended dis-
eussion. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427
U.S. 278, 282 n.10 (1976). And this Court has applied
a “but for” test in related contexts. See, e.g., NURB v.
Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983)
(involving the standard of causation applicable to dis-
charges based in part on protected union activity); Mt.




(involving the standard of causation applicable to dis-
charges based in part on constitutionally-protected con-
duct).®
Commentators also agree that a “but for” test is the
appropriate substantive standard of causation. Writing
in the context of an age discrimination case, one author
has explained why only a “but for” test satisfies congres-
sional intent:
If relief were granted every time age was consid-
ered, the effect might go well beyond the remedial
intent of the Act, since relief arguably would be
awarded to claimants who never had an opportunity
for the job at any age. While such a broad construc-
tion would provide a strong deterrent against age
discrimination, it probably would exceed the prohibi-
tion Congress envisioned.
Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimina-
tion Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34
Vand. L. Rev. 1205, 1256 (1981).
This reasoning is equally applicable in the Title VII
context, and of course makes it clear that the mere
mresence of some element of “sex stereotyping” in an
employer’s decisionmaking process does not in and of
itself constitute a violation of Title VII. As Judge Wil-
liams recognized in dissent (Pet. App. 37a), Title VII
was never intended to be “an engine for rooting out sex-
ist thoughts”; the statute is a prohibition against dis-
® The “but for” test also has been adopted in cases arising under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.
§ 621 et seq. See, e.g., Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1019
(1st Cir. 1979) (plaintiff required to prove “that his age was the
‘determining factor’ in his discharge in the sense that, ‘but for’
his employer’s motive to discriminate * * * he would not have been
discharged”). In language that precisely parallels Section 703 of
Title VII, the ADEA expressly prohibits only those actions taken
“because of” a worker’s age. 29 U.S.C. § 623. Although Loeb arose
under the ADEA, it is frequently cited in Title VII cases. See,
e.g., Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252 n.4, 258-259; Lewis v. University of
Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d at 917 n.8; Monteiro v. Poole Silver Co., 615





criminatory conduct that actually causes an adverse
employmentdecision.
This case gives this Court an opportunity to reaffirm
the fundamental proposition that Title VII as a substan-
tive matter is not violated unless diserimination was a
“but for” cause of an adverse employment decision. That
this proposition has recently suffered from erosion is
apparent from an examination of the Eighth Circuit’s
unsound decision in Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1818 (1985)
(en banc). There, the court held that an employer is
liable under Title VII even if the plaintiff shows only
“that an unlawful motive played some part in the em-
ployment decision.” 778 F.2d at 1823 (emphasis added).
The court ruled that such a showingis sufficient to entitle
the employee, at a minimum, to a remedy such as decla-
ratory or injunctive relief and partial attorneys’ fees.
Id. at 1324. Although the Eighth Circuit also held that
an employer can avoid the imposition of additional relief,
such as reinstatement or back pay, if he shows by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff would not
have been hired or promoted in any event (ibid.), this
supposed mitigation should not be allowed to conceal the
real effect of the Eighth Circuit’s position: a defendant
may be held to have violated Title VII even if anillicit
factor did not play a decisive role in the employment
decision.’ That result is inconsistent with Title VII.1!
10 The Ninth Circuit employs an analysis similar to that adopted
in Bibbs, but takes an even more extreme position by requiring
the defendant to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it
would have taken the same action absent the prohibited motivation
if it is to avoid the award of affirmative relief. E.g., Fadhl v. City
& County of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163 (9th Cir. 1984).
11JIn large part, the Eighth. Circuit rested its decision on the
supposition that Title VII itself, in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (1) and
2000e-5(g), distinguishes between the liability and remedy phases
of a Title VII case. See 778 F.2d at 1321-1322. This is a clear
misreading of the statute. First, the liability provision of the
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), explicitly requires a causal rela-
tionship between the discriminatory motive and the employment
decision at issue. See page 23, supra. Thus, the notion that lia-
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2. The Plaintiff Properly Bears The Burden Of Per-
suasion On The Issue Of “But For” Causation.
Once it is clearly understood that Congress did not
intend to create any substantive liability under Title VII
except in cases where discrimination played a decisive
role in an employment decision, the proper allocation of
the burden of persuason on the issue of causation becomes
apparent: the plaintiff’s case fails unless she shows by
a preponderance of the evidence that, but for discrimina-
tion, she would have been promoted. Congress’s purpose
to “specify cause” and “pinch down” and “limit” relief
to cases where it would achieve the “purposes of the act,”
and to exclude from liability cases where the employment
decision is based on facts “other * * * than discrimina-
tion” (see remarks of Representatives Celler and Gill, at
pages 25-26, supra), cannot be achieved if liability is im-
posed without an affirmative showing that discrimination
caused an unfavorable employment decision. Shifting the
burden of persuasion will have the inevitable tendency to
sweep within the statute’s coverage numerous cases
where the employer in fact acted on a bona fide basis,
but cannot establish the negative proposition, that dis-
crimination was not a decisive factor in its decision.
Imposing the burden of persuasion on the employer will
therefore have the effect of producing the very result
Congress sought to avoid: it will turn Title VII into a
statute that punishes legitimate employment decisions
not based on “race, color, creed, sex, or national origin’
(remarks of Rep. Celler, page 24, supra).
bility under Title VII may rest on a finding that an illegal motive
was merely present is untenable. Second, the legislative history
makes it clear that Section 2000e-2(a) and the remedy provision,
Section 2000e-5(g¢), were intended to operate in tandem. As
we have noted (see page 25, supra), Representative Celler de-
scribed his amendment to the statute’s remedy provision by ex-
plaining that its purpose was to “specify cause” and topreclude a
court from “find[ing] any violation of the act” based on facts other
than illicit discrimination. 110 Cong. Rec. 2567 (1964) (emphasis
added). Clearly, there was no intent to limit the requirement of a






This Court already has determined that the general
rules governing the trial of Title VII suits are to be no
different from the rules applicable in other kinds of civil
litigation. See, e.g., United States Postal Service v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) (stating that the dif-
ferences between Title VII litigation and other civil cases
do not mean “that trial courts or reviewing courts should
treat discrimination differently from other ultimate ques-
tions of fact”). And Burdine itself instructs that the
burden of proof is allocated in discrimination cases in
the same wayit is allocated in other kindsof civil litiga-
tion. The ultimate question in a Title VII case, on which
the burden of persuasion never shifts from the plaintiff,
is whether intentional discrimination actually caused the
plaintiff’s injury. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-256. Thus,
Burdine clearly precludes a Title VII defendant from
being saddled with proving the negative of what this
Court already has determined to be the plaintiff’s ulti-mate burden.
Contrary to the court of appeals’ view (Pet. App. 22a),Burdine and its predecessor, McDonnell Douglas, supplythe framework for analyzing the ultimate question ofintentional discrimination in all Title VII disparatetreatment cases in which the defendant has advanced alegitimate reason for its employment decision, includingso-called “mixed motives” cases. Burdine teaches that inany case where the employer proffers a nondiscriminatoryreason for its action, and so “raises a genuine issue offact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff”(450 U.S. at 254-255), “the burden of persuasion [is onthe plaintiff] to demonstrate that the [defendant’s] prof-fered reason was not the true reason for the employmentdecision” (id. at 256), but was a pretext.




a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for its decision.Thus, the crucial portion of the Burdine analysis is thethird and final stage, at which Hopkins should have beenrequired “to prove by a preponderance of the evidencethat the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant werenot its true reasons” (450 U.S. at 258).
According to the court of appeals, however, this thirdand vital Burdine stage disappears altogether in “mixedmotives” cases. The plaintiff need no longer prove, oncethe employer has demonstrated legitimate motives, thatthose “were not [the employer’s] true reasons,” but mayrest on her showing of discriminatory motive (or, as inthis case, a showing of unconscious “sex stereotyping”),confident of success unless the employer can meet theheavy burden of proving the negative proposition that“impermissible bias was not the determinative factor” inits decision (Pet. App. 25a).
The court of appeals utterly failed to explain why thethird and final stage of the Burdine framework does notsufficiently answer the ultimate question of causation ina “mixed motives” case. If 4 plaintiff succeedsin provingthat the employer’s proffered motive was pretextual andnot its true reason, she will simultaneously have suc-ceeded in proving that, but for intentional discrimina-tion, the challenged employment decision would not havebeen made. This is so irrespective of whether the case ischaracterized as involving “mixed motives.” ” Given the




identity of the ultimate issue in all cases in which the
parties make differing claims about what in fact caused
the challenged employment decision—an issue as to which
Burdineteaches that the plaintiff always bears the bur-
den of persuasion—there can be “nobasis for transpos-
ing a burden of proof upon a private employer in a Title
VII * * * case, irrespective of the nature or quantum
of the plaintiff’s proof.” Edwards, Direct Evidence of
Discriminatory Intent and the Burden, of Proof: An
Analysis and Critique, 48 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1, 23
(1986). See Bd. of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 29
(1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (in disparate treatment
cases, “the ultimate question involves an identification of
the real reason for the employment decision. On that
question—as all the [Court’s Title VII] cases make per-
fectly clear—it is only the burden of producing evidence
* * * which shifts to the employer; the burden of per-
suasion * * * remains with the plaintiff’’) .*
proffered reason is a “coverup,” the court of appeals then felt freeto ignore the Burdine framework in “mixed motives” cases.
This is an untenable reading of this Court’s precedents. TheCourt plainly stated in McDonnell Douglas that after the defendanthas asserted a valid reason for its decision, the plaintiff mightmeet her burden of persuasion on the issue of intentional discrimi-nation either by showing theproffered reason to be a “coverup” orby showing that “whatever the stated reasons for [her] rejection,the decision was in reality * * * premised” on discriminatoryfactors (411 U.S. at 805 & n.18)—that is, that the illegitimatemotive was a “but for” causeof the decision reached. Furthermore,Burdine clearly treats “pretextual” reasons very broadly, includingwithin that characterization any reason that is not the “true rea-son” that accounts for the employer’s decision. 450 U.S. at 258, 256.The court of appeals’ position that different burden of proofrules apply depending on whether “intentional discrimination” isalleged to exist because the employer’s stated reason for its deci-sion is a “coverup,” or because it is by itself insufficient to explainthe decision reached, directly conflicts with the teaching of Mce-Donnell Douglas and Burdine that theplaintiff bears the ultimateburden of persuasion in any attempt to show that a legitimatereason proffered by the employer was not its “true reason.”






The court of appeals’ rule that Burdineis inapplicablein so called “mixed motives” cases (not involving a“coverup” (see note 12, supra)) renders nearly uselessthe delicately balanced analytical framework this Courtestablished in that case. It ig a rare Title VII action inwhich the plaintiff cannot make the claim that the em-ployer had “mixed motives.” Cf. Arlington Heights v.Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S, 252, 265(1977) (noting in the context of legislative or adminis-trative decisions that it can “[r]arely * * * pe saidthat * * * a decision [was] motivated solely by a singleconcern, or even that a particular purpose was the ‘domi-nant’ or ‘primary’ one’). Thus, under the court ofappeals’ approach, the Burdine framework will have noapplication in the usual disparate treatment action, andas a general rule it will be the defendant who, contraryto the principle enunciated in Burdine, must prove thata discriminatory motive was not a “but for” causeofitsaction.
 
fered explanation for its decision was pretextual and not its truereason, and she framed her argument to the district court in ac-cordance with the traditional McDonnell Douglas-Burdine analysis.See, ¢.g., Plaintiff’s Trial Brief 6; Plaintiff’s Post-Trial Brief 11.
14In NLRB y. Transportation Management Corp., the Courtdeferred to the NLRB’s position that once the General Counsel ofthe Board has proved that conduct protected by the National LaborRelations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., was a “substantial” or“motivating” factor in the discharge of an employee, the burdenshifts to the employer to prove, by a preponderance of theevidence,“that the discharge would have occurred in any event and for validreasons” (462 U.S. at 400). Transportation Management simplymakes it clear that an agency to which Congress has granted broadgeneral powers has authority to adopt this burden of proof alloca-tion. See Donovan v. Stafford Construction Co., 732 F.2d 954, 958-




The court of appeals’ unwarranted evisceration of the
Burdine analysis not only lacks precedential support, but
is incompatible with the clear intent of Congress that the
plaintiff must prove the causal link between discrimina-
tion and the challenged employment decision. See, ¢.g.,
110 Cong. Rec. 2560 (Rep. Goodell) (emphasis added)
(“[t]he burden would be on the complainant to show
that there had been discrimination. * * * The burden
all the way would be on those whoalleged the discrimina-
tion”) ; id. at 6549 (Sen. Humphrey) (“plaintiff would
have the burden of proving that discrimination had oc-
curred’’) ; id. at 7214 (Interpretative Memorandum sub-
mitted by Sen. Clark and Sen. Case, bipartisan floor
managers) (“the plaintiff, as in any civil case, would
U.S.A., Inc. V. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-845 (1984)), but it sheds
no light on this Court’s task of interpreting Title VII.
In Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287, this Court held that once a
plaintiff has shown that constitutionally protected conduct was a
“substantial” or “motivating” factor in an adverse employment
decision, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that it would have reached the same
employment decision in the absence of the protected conduct. Of
course, Mt. Healthy and Transportation Management addressed
neither the specific language of Title VII nor the clear congres-
sional intent that a Title VII plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of
proving that a discriminatory motive made a difference to the
decision the employer reached. As one commentator has observed,
“Tallthough Mt. Healthy may be applicable toconstitutional claims
involving free speech, equal protection, or due process, there is no
basis for transposing a burden of proof upon a private employer
in a Title VII * * * disparate treatment case.” Edwards, supra,
43 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. at 23 (emphasis added).
It is of course these distinguishing factors that made it un-
necessary for the Seventh Circuit to discuss Transportation Man-
agement and Mt. Healthy in holding that the burden of persuasion
in a Title VII disparate treatment case never shifts from the
plaintiff, even if the case can be characterized as one involving
“mixed motives.” McQuillen, 830 F.2d at 664. See also Bellissimo
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F.2d 175, 179 (3d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1085 (1986); Ross v. Communications Satel-
lite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 865-366 (4th Cir. 1985); Jack v. Texaco
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have the burden of proving that discrimination had oc-curred”); id. at 7255 (Sen. Case) (“[t]he burden ofproof is on the plaintiff”) ; id. at 15866 (Sen. Humphrey)(“[t]he burden of proof that discrimination has occurredrests with the complainant”).
Traditional indicia for identifying who must bear theburden of persuasion on a fact also lead to the conclusionthat the plaintiff in a disparate treatment suit mustprove that discrimination was a “but for” cause of theemployer’s action. The burden of persuasion traditionallyis borne by “the party to whose case the fact is essen-tial.” 9 J, Wigmore, Evidence § 2486, at 288 (Chad-bourn rev. 1981) (emphasis in original). As shownabove, the language and legislative history of Title VITdemonstrate that it is essential to liability under thestatute that unlawfyl discrimination was a “put for”cause of the employment decision of which the plaintiffcomplains. Since causation is essential to the plaintiff’scase, Congress logically provided that the plaintiff shouldbear the burden of proving it. Similarly, the burden ofpersuasion is often said to be “apon the party having inform the affirmative allegation.” Ibid. (emphasis inoriginal). On the issue of causation, that party isobviously the plaintiff.»
 
1 The third indicator mentioned by Wigmore—that the burdenof persuasion as to a fact is borne by a party “who presumably haspeculiar means of knowledge” asto that fact (9 Wigmore, Evidence§ 2486, at 290 (emphasis in original) )—does not Suggest that aTitle VII defendant should bear the burden of persuasion on causa-tion. As this Court noted in Burdine, “the liberal discovery rulesapplicable to any civil suit in federal] court are supplemented ina







The court of appeals’ rule, placing the burden of dis-
proving intentional discrimination on the employer is,
finally, perversely at odds with one of the Court’s pri-
mary purposes in formulating the Burdine framework—
to provide a structure that would “bring the litigants
and the court expeditiously and fairly to [the] ultimate
question” whether the plaintiff has persuaded the trier
of fact that intentional discrimination caused her injury.
450 U.S. at 253. The court of appeals’ insistence that
the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework is inapplicable
in so-called “mixed motives” cases runs counter to this
goal by requiring litigants and courts to employ a differ-
ent mode of analysis even though the ultimate factual
inquiry remains exactly the same—whether intentional
discrimination in fact caused the injury of which the
plaintiff complains.
B. Even If A Defendant Must Show That The Same Deci-
sion Would Have Been Made Without The Forbidden
Motive, The Court Of Appeals Erred By Requiring
That That Showing Be Made By “Clear And Convine-
ing” Evidence.
The court of appeals not only switched the burden of
proof to the defendant; it also held that the defendant
must meet that burden by “clear and convincing” evi-
fact, “Price Waterhouse made every document generated by [its
partnership] admissions process on candidates proposed for ad-
mission in 1982, 1983 and 1984 available to the plaintiff during the
course of discovery in this case” (id. at 42a).
16 The proliferation of differing standards and burdens of proof
all intended to answer the same question can only add needless
complications to the trial of Title VII actions without producing any
offsetting gains. Lower federal courts have noted the confusion
regarding the proper standards of proof in Title VII cases, thus
highlighting the need for a single, easily-applied formula for the
trial of these actions. See, e.g., Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 764 F.2d at 179; Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d
at 921 (Adams, J., dissenting) ; Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,
657 F.2d 909, 916 n.9 (7th Cir. 1981), vacated, 456 U.S. 1002
(1982) (noting “nearly continuous confusion in the lower courts”





dence. Requiring a defendant to bear such a heavy bur-
den is without precedent in this Court’s cases. The Court
has, on occasion, deemed it appropriate to require plain-
tiffs, who seek the courts’ aid in imposing a duty on
defendants, to make a showing by “clear and convincing”
evidence before that affirmative intervention will occur.
But the Court has never, as far as we know, held that a
defendant may be subjected to coercion by a court order
unless the defendant disproves the plaintiff’s allegations
by “clear and convincing” evidence. To impose such a
rule on Title VII defendants, without a clear statement
by Congress that it wished to perpetrate such a radical
innovation, would be fundamentally unfair and illegiti-
mate.
This Court has already indicated that the rules that
apply in Title VII cases should not differ from the rules
that apply in other civil cases:
All courts have recognized that the question fac-
ing triers of fact in discrimination cases is both
sensitive and difficult. The prohibitions against dis-
crimination contained in the Civil Rights Act of
1964 reflect an important national policy. There will
seldom be “eyewitness” testimony as to the employ-
er’s mental processes. But none of this means that
trial courts or reviewing courts should treat discrim-
ination differently from other ultimate questions of
fact.
Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716 (emphasis added); see also id.
at 718 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“the ultimate deter-
mination of factual liability in discrimination cases
should be no different from that in other types of civil
suits”).
The standard rule in our legal system is that facts are
shown by a preponderance of evidence. “The preponder-
ance of the evidence standard * * * is the standard that
is applied most frequently in litigation between private
parties in every State.” Rivera v. Minnich, 107 S. Ct.
3001, 3003 (1987) ; see also Herman & MacLean v. Hud-
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441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979); E. Cleary, McCormick on Evi-
dence § 340, at 959 (8d ed. 1984); 9 Wigmore, supra,
§ 2498, at 419. And the general use of the preponderance
standard is based on the soundest of reasons: it mini-
mizes the risk of erroneous decisions.17 The preponder-
ance standard is thus the standard most consistent with
“Tt]he function of legal process, as that concept is em-
bodied in the Constitution, and in the realm of factfind-
ing, [which] is to minimize the risk of erroneous deci-
sions.” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correc-
tional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) ; see Brook, supra,
at 109 (‘Trying to be right as often as possible may be
the best we can do.”). Further, the preponderance stand-
ard is equitable; it ‘allows both parties to ‘share the risk
of error in roughly equal fashion.’ Any other standard
expresses a preference for one side’s interests.” Herman
& MacLean, 459 U.S. at 390 (quoting Addington, 441
U.S. at 423) (emphasis added).
There must, therefore, exist important reasons before
we depart from an equal allocation of the risk of error
in civil cases. This Court has, on rare occasions, found
such reasons. But all such cases have involved the judg-
ment that the coercive intervention of a court should be
withheld unless a strong justification is first shown by
the plaintiff; none has used the “clear and convincing”
test in order to make such an intervention easier.
17 See, e.g., 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 10.4, at
819 (1979) (elevated standardsare “inconsistent with accuracy”);
Brook, Inevitable Errors: The Preponderance of the Evidence
Standard in Civil Litigation, 18 Tulsa LJ. 79, 86 (1982) (pre-
ponderance standard “is the one which must be adopted if the
decisionmaker’s goal is to minimize the absolute number of total’
errors which will arise from the course of decisions in the long
run”); Winter, The Jury and the Risk of Nonpersuasion, 5 Law
& Soc. Rev. 335, 337 (1971) (preponderance standard results in
correct decisions over 50% of the time, while elevated standards





It is thus revealing that, with the exception of defama-
tion cases and a few old equity cases,'® all such cases
have involved “government-initiated proceedings that
threaten the individual involved with ‘a significant dep-
rivation of liberty’ or ‘stigma.’ ” Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added). For example, the Court has held that the “clear
and convincing” standard applies in proceedings to ter-
minate the “fundamental” and “precious” interest in
parental rights, id. at 758, 758; in involuntary commit-
ment proceedings, Addington, 441 U.S. at 427 (individ-
ual’s interest is of such “weight and gravity” that higher
standard of proof is warranted); in deportation proceed-
ings, Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966); and in de-
naturalization proceedings, Schneiderman v. United
States, 320 U.S. 118, 122, 125 (1943) (citizenship inter-
est is so “precious” as to be “the highest hope of civil-
ized men”). On the other hand, the Court has declined
to impose the “clear and convincing” standard even in
the case of serious governmental impositions such as
expatriation and disqualification from a chosen profes-
son.?”
18It is by now hornbook law that public figure plaintiffs in
defamation cases must prove actual malice by clear and convincing
evidence. See, ¢.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 328, 342
(1974) ; Rosenbloom v. Metromedia Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52-53 (1971)
(plurality opinion) ; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
285-286 (1964). Defamation cases are not government-initiated.
They are similar to the other cases in which this Court hasin-
voked an elevated standard, however, in that they involve a grave
threat to the constitutionally protected interest in free speech.
In the equity cases, the Court imposed the clear and convincing
standard on plaintiffs for actions brought to set aside, on the basis
of fraud, patents for inventions, see United States v. American
Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224 (1897), contracts for sale of land, see
Southern Development Co. v. Silva, 125 U.S. 247 (1888), and land
patents, see Maxwell Land-Grant Case, 121 U.S. 325 (1887). In
these cases, the Court obviously was moved by the special need for
stability when dealing with settled property interests.
19 The Court has held that due process does not require the use





The message of all this jurisprudence is clear: only
the gravest deprivations warrant sacrificing the greater
accuracy and fairness provided by the preponderance
standard. More generally, we reiterate that this Court’s
rare invocations of the “clear and convincing” standard,
whether in a government-initiated proceeding, a defama-
tion action, or an equity proceeding to set aside a written
instrument, have always been to protect the rights of the
defendant.” Never has this Court required a defendant
to bear a burden of “clear and convincing” evidence.
In this light, it becomes obvious that it would be en-
tirely anomalous to place on a Title VII defendant the
burden of disproving the plaintiff’s allegations of inten-
tional discrimination by “clear and convincing” evi-
444 U.S. 252 (1980). Several years prior to Terrazas, the Court,
in the absence of congressional direction, had invoked the‘clear
and convincing” standard for expatriation proceedings. The Court
did so because it found the consequences of such proceedings to be
“drastic.” Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 134 (1958). After
Nishikawa, Congress specified that the preponderance standard
should be used in expatriation proceedings. The Court in Terrazas
held that due process did not require a higher standard, explaining
that “expatriation proceedings are civil in nature and do not
threaten a loss of liberty.” Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 266.
The Court also refused to invoke the “clear and convincing”
standard for proceedings to disbar investment advisers under the
securities laws. Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981). Even though
the defendant in such a proceeding stands to lose his livelihood,
the Court found no occasion for departing from the preponderance
standard typically employed in civil litigation.
20 As we noted earlier (see note 14, supra), the Court from time
to time has permitted an evidentiary burden to shift to the defend-
ant after the plaintiff has established the existence of an improper
motive. See NLRB vy. Transportation Management Corp.; Mt.
Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle. It is notable that in these
cases the Court assumed, as if no discussion were needed, that the
burden placed on the defendant was thetraditional preponderance
standard. Transportation Management, 462 U.S. at 403; Mt.





dence.”’ It is the Title VII defendant, not the Title VII
plaintiff, who is threatened with the stigma of acoercive
governmental sanction. It is the Title VII plaintiff, not
the Title VII defendant, whoseeks the affirmative inter-
vention of the government to reorder the workplace. Any
analogy between this situation and cases such as de-
naturalization and loss of parental rights is obviously
misplaced.
We have already explained above (see pages 29-35,
supra) that shifting the burden of persuasion to the de-
“1 In her Brief in Opposition (at 12), Hopkins relied on a regula-
tion promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion that imposes a burden of “clear and convincing” evidence on
federal agency employers in “mixed motives” cases. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1613.271. Her reliance is misplaced.
For one thing, this regulation applies only to federal administra-
tive proceedings, not. to judicial proceedings involving either fed-
eral or private sector employees. Cf. Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d at
1324 n.5 (in federal employee’s Title VIT action, court expressly
rejected the “clear and convincing” standard in favor of the pre-
ponderance standard). In federal administrative proceedings, the
government is of course free to impose a higher burden upon itself
than Title VII requires, but, the EEOC has noauthority toestab-
lish rules of decision for the federal courts. See Woodby v. INS,
385 U.S. at 284 (establishing burdens of proof “is the kind of
question which has traditionally been left to the judiciary to
resolve’).
Second, the regulation itself has no power to persuade. In adopt-
ing it in 1978, the Civil Service Commission, predecessor to the
EEOC, stated only that applying a less elevated standard “ig in-
consistent with recent court decisions” and thatit desired “to bring
its administrative process into conformity with the clear intent of
the courts.” 43 Fed. Reg. 33732 (1978). The only cases invoking
the “clear and convincing” test at that time, however, were Day v.
Matthews, 530 F.2d 1083, 1085-1086 (D.C. Cir. 1976), and the Fifth
Circuit cases upon which Day exclusively relied. The Fifth Circuit
is, however, no longer willing to shift the burden to defendants,
let alone impose a burden of “clear and convincing” proof. See,
e.g., Jack v. Texaco Research Center, 743 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir.
1984). Given that the only remaining support for the EEOC regu-
lation is the D.C. Cireuit precedent for the very case that is now
under review, it makes nosenseto ask this Court to defer or give






fendant in Title VII cases itself threatens the achieve-
ment of Congress’s goal to limit Title VII to cases where
discrimination was in fact the cause of an adverse
employment decision. That threat would be immensely
magnified if the burden on the defendant were raised to
a “clear and convincing” standard. The point is vividly
illustrated by the facts of this case. Price Waterhouse
made a persuasive showing that the failure to promote
Hopkins was based on serious deficiencies in her quali-
fications, not on her sex. It was, precisely, in order to
discount that showing that the court of appeals resorted
to the “clear and convincing” test as a requirement for
the defendant. Here, and in future cases, the effect of
that test is to make it virtually impossible for the de-
fendant to rebut the plaintiff’s allegations of intentional
discrimination. The result will be to hinder, rather than
aid, the “ ‘broad overriding interest shared by employer,
employee and consumer’ ”’: the achievement of “‘efficient
and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and
. . . neutral employment and personnel decisions’ ” (Bur-
dine, 450 U.S. at 259) (citations omitted) ).
Radical innovations in the law—such as placing on a
defendant the burden of persuasion to disprove an alle-
gation of intentional discrimination, and then requiring
that this be done by “clear and convincing” evidence—
should come, if at all, from Congress. In the absence of
a clear statement by Congress that it wished to create
such an inequitable rule, the decision of the court of
appeals to impose such a requirement cannot stand.
C. The Court Of Appeals Evaded This Court’s Decision In
Burdine By Improperly Characterizing This Case As
One Involving “Mixed Motives.”
The court of appeals in this case adopted an approach
to the burden of proof issue that makes it virtually
impossible for an employer to win a Title VII case, even
though there exists overwhelming evidence of a valid,





Worse yet, this Draconian approach was applied to a
case that should never have been characterized as a
“mixed motives” case at all.
The court of appeals did not disturb the district court’s
findings that, under Burdine, would have required a
judgment for the defendant: first, that Price Water-
house had established a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
explanation for its decision not to make Hopkinsa part-
ner; and, second, that Hopkins failed to show that this
explanation was not the “true reason” for the decision,
and, in fact, had not proved that she would have been
made a partner even in the absence of “sex stereotyping.”
Rather, the court ruled that a Title VII violation had
occurred solely because some participants in the evalua-
tion process (but not the actual decisionmakers them-
selves) had engaged in unconscious and unquantifiable
“sex stereotyping” and because the firm had not taken
steps to eliminate this improper element from the en-
vironment.
The court of appeals then evaded Burdine by proceed-
ing on this ephemeral basis to characterize the case as
one where “mixed motives” were present (and a shift in
the burden of persuasion therefore warranted). As we
have shown above (at pages 29-36, supra), shifting the
burdens and standards of proof, even in real “mixed
motives” cases, cannot be reconciled with Burdine. But,
assuming that there exists a category of Title VII cases
in which it would be appropriate to shift the burden of
persuasion to the defendant, the court of appeals erred
in applying its rule to this case, where the only evidence
of the existence of “mixed motives” was the presence of
an intuitively divined element of sexual stereotyping in
the atmosphere, and where there was no concrete evi-
dence that that element played any causal role at all in
the employment decision. Virtually any case can be
transformed into one of “mixed motives” on the type of





proach, the Burdinerule, which unequivocally places the
ultimate burden of persuasion in discrimination cases
upon the plaintiff, will simply be swallowed up by the
“mixed motives” exception, and employers will be de-
prived of the opportunity fairly to contest Title VII cases
based upon the rules adopted by Congress as interpreted
by this Court.
“The application of law requires a factual predicate;
an action without such a predicate is lawless.” Jaffe,
Judicial Review: Question of Fact, 69 Harv. L. Rev.
1020, 1021 (1956). The necessary factual predicate for
bringing the burden-shifting rule into operation must
consist of substantial evidence that Price Waterhouse’s
explanation for failing to promote Hopkins wasnot the
“true reason” forits action (Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
But in this case a series of conjuring tricks was per-
mitted to substitute for substantial evidence. Price
Waterhouse’s overwhelming evidence that Hopkins was
not qualified was discounted, and intentional discrimina-
tion found, on the basis of a chain of intuitive hunches
about “unconscious” sexism that may have played an
“unquantifiable”’ role in an employment decision—
hunches that were arrived at by Dr. Fiske without in-
quiry into the actual facts that motivated Price Water-
house’s decision. These hunches then were, in turn,
magically transformed into evidentiary “facts” by a shift
in the burden of persuasion. What was missing was the
crucial premise for bringing the “mixed motives” bur-den of proof rule into play at all: an antecedent finding
that there exists in the record as a whole a substantialand objective basis for concluding that discriminatory
factors played a causal (motivational) role in the deci-sion not to promote Hopkins.
We havealready explained why the burden-shiftinganalysis employed in Mt. Healthy and Transportation.Management should not be applied to Title VII disparatetreatment cases. But even assuming that burden-shifting









should in any event require, as a threshold matter, that
the plaintiff establish the same substantial factual predi-
cate that supported the claims of unlawful motivation in
those cases. In Transportation Management, for example,
the evidence of the prohibited motive was clear and
unequivocal: the discharged employee’s supervisor, upon
learning of the employee’s union organizing activities,
referred to him as “two-faced” and “promised to get even
with him.” 462 U.S. at 396. And in Mt. Healthy the
school district expressly advised Doyle that its decision
not to renew his contract was based at least in part on
Doyle’s communications with a radio station about an
issue of concern to the school district—conduct that this
Court held was constitutionally protected. 429 U.S. at
282-284. The evidence of the causal role of unlawful
motivation was substantial and objectively ascertainable.
Nothing in either Transportation Management or Mt.
Healthy even remotely suggests that the Court would
have found “mixed motives” in those cases in the absence
of such a predicate.
The evidence in this case stands in stark contrast and
vividly illustrates the danger that the court of appeals’
“mixed motives” analysis will dissolve Burdine’s funda-
mental rule. Here, the courtsrelied_almost_entirely
on the“expert” testimony of Dr. Fiske to support the
conclusion that “sex stereotyping” played a significant
role in the challenged partnership decision. But Dr.
Fiske made no inquiry at all into the concrete facts of
Hopkins’ performance at Price Waterhouse, facts that
were before the Policy Board. She simply isolated some
of the language used by Price Waterhouse partners in
their written evaluations and labeled the partners’ choice
of words as “stereotypic thinking.” The court of appeals
accepted Dr. Fiske’s assertion that this conclusion was
valid, even though Dr. Fiske had never met Hopkins,
had never met any of the partners whose comments about
Hopkins she categorically condemned, and knew nothing









house. Plainly, this is not substantial, concrete evidence
that “stereotyping” even occurred, let alone that it may
have played a causal role in the challenged employment
decision.
Even strong proponents of sex stereotyping as a theory
of liability under Title VII agree that it should give way
in the face of “specific instances of unacceptable or un-
desirable behavior” on the part of the employee—in-
stances showing that the use of supposedly stereotypic
words to describe a woman, such as “aggressive,” are not
stereotypic at all but instead represent the reality of
the situation and provide support for the employer’s
claim that it had a legitimate business reason for reject-
ing an applicant. See Taub, Keeping Women in Their
Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of Employment
Discrimination, 21 B.C.L. Rev. 845, 395-397 (1980).
Here, the only plausible conclusion that can be drawn
from the record as a wholeis that the partners’ chosen
words, far from reflecting supposedly stereotypic think-
ing, accurately described “specific instances” of unac-
ceptable and undesirable behavior. For example, Hop-
kins’ most ardent supporter, Thomas Beyer,testified that
he had heard complaints about her relations with staff
“almost from the day [Beyer] joined the Office of Gov-
ernment Services in 1979.” Tr. 163-164. One of the St.
Louis partners supported his evaluation by noting that
Hopkins’ managementstyle of “using ‘trial & error tech-
niques’ * * * caused a complete alienation of the staff
towards Ann & a fear that they would haveto work with
Ann if we won the project.” Def. Exh. 27 (emphasis
added). Moreover, the record is replete with particular-
ized examples of Hopkins’ difficult relations with staff,
ranging from the “vitriolic” attack she launched on vari-
ous OGS staff members (see page 8, supra), to her
screaming obscenities at a consultant for 45 minutes
(Tr. 193). Surely this provided more than ample sup-
port for suggesting that she would benefit from “a course




harsh, difficult to work with &, as a result, cause[d]
significant turmoil,” and that, as the Policy Board ulti-
mately concluded, she needed to develop “social grace”
before becoming a partner at Price Waterhouse (Def.
Exh. 38). Had Dr. Fiske taken the trouble to investigate
the factual foundation of the comments she categorically
condemned as stereotypic, she would have been forced to
acknowledge that they were supported by “specific in-
stances of unacceptable or undesirable behavior” (Taub,
supra, 21 B.C.L. Rev. at 395).
Significantly, unlike Dr. Fiske, the Admissions Com-
mittee at Price Waterhouse did investigate the factual
bases of the negative comments about Hopkins (as well
as those made about other candidates) by making per-
sonal visits to partners who had filled out evaluation
forms in order to get a better understanding of the
actual reasons for the partners’ recommendations. See,
e.g., Tr. 244-245, 254-257, 560-561. Thus, the Admis-
sions Committee made its recommendation to the Policy
Board not simply on the basis of the supposedly stereo-
typic remarks reflected in the partners’ written com-
ments, but on the basis of personal interviews that
brought out the underlying facts.”
22In fact, Dr. Fiske admitted that “external” explanations for
the comments about Hopkins may have existed; yet she insisted
that she could characterize the process as tainted without investigat-
ing whether or not they did exist. Here is an exchange between
the district judge and Dr. Fiske (J.A. 34):
THE COURT: Well, now take a partner whois supervising
the plaintiff. And she asks for his advice and he gives it to
her. And she comes back * * *. She tells him that his advice
was stupid. And she busts into his room without knocking
when the door is closed, frequently. * * *
Now, what are you trying to tell me about that, that under
those facts his vote should not be counted or that he is dis-
criminating sexually?
THE WITNESS: No, I am not trying to say that. * * *
Any given incident like that frequently has an external ex-





Furthermore, Dr. Fiske’s testimony—even assuming it
correctly categorized particular comments as_ stereo-
typic—provided no basis for a finding that stereotyping
had an impact upon the Policy Board’s decision to place
Hopkins’ partnership candidacy on hold. In fact, nothing
in the record supports the conclusion that the Policy
Board based its decision on anything other than the ob-
jective facts that all the evaluations, whether or not
stereotypical, recounted about Hopkins. And, as Judge
Williams demonstrated in his dissent (Pet. App. 30a-
36a), the handful of statements upon which Dr. Fiske
relied for her “stereotyping” conclusion were, virtually
without exception, either (1) made by Hopkins’ sup-
porters and therefore were unlikely to have adversely
affected her partnership candidacy, or (2) made at a
remote time and about other women who did become
partners, or (3) made by persons outside the decision-
making chain, so that no adverse effect on Hopkins could
have occurred, and/or (4) made in a fashion so that the
implications of the statements were either utterly benign
or, at worst, ambiguous, requiring a healthy imagination
to assign illicit motivation to them. At the most, there-
fore, these comments might conceivably be taken as in-
dicating that stereoypical thinking was sometimes pres-
ent “in the air’ at Price Waterhouse—not as evidence
of discrimination in the particular decision to hold Hop-
kins’ partnership bid (see Pet. App. 30a) (Williams, J.,
dissenting) .
In sum, Dr. Fiske’s testimony could provide no evi-
dence of any relevance whatever to a determination
whether there existed a causal relationship between the
allegedly stereotypical aspect of the remarks she relied
on and the Policy Board’s decision. Neither Dr. Fiske’s
testimony, nor any other evidence presented in this case,
could reasonably support a finding that any single mem-
ber of the Policy Board—let alone a majority of the
Board’s members—was influenced by the stereotypical
rhetoric (if such it was) in which a very few partners  
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couched their remarks, rather than by the facts about
Hopkins’ behavior that so evidently underlay both those
remarks and the many others before the Board—remarks
made in evaluations of Hopkins’ performance over the
years as well as during the partnership evaluation proc-
ess.
Even if the Court should someday hold that there are
circumstances that justify a shifting of the burden of
persuasion to the defendant in a Title VII case, no such
circumstances existed here. If this case can be char-
acterized as one involving “mixed motives,” then virtu-
ally any other Title VII case could be so labeled, and the
Burdine principle—squarely placing the burden on the
plaintiff to prove discriminatory employment action—will
simply disappear in a sea of findings of “mixed motives”
that are totally lacking in concrete evidentiary support.
At a minimum, the Court should rule that a case may
not be characterized as a “mixed motives” case for the
purpose of placing the burden of persuasion on the de-
fendant unless the trial court first finds that there is a
substantial, concrete basis in the record to support the
proposition that the legitimate reason for the employ-
ment decision established by the employer was a pretext
under Burdine—that is, that it was not the “true rea-
son” for the decision. When this standard is applied
here, the conclusion is inescapable that the court of ap-
peals improperly held that the burden of persuasion
shifted to Price Waterhouse; and, accordingly, its judg-
ment mustbe reversed.
23 The Court may find a possible analogy hereto the history and
role of the “substantial evidence on the whole record” rule in ad-
ministrative law, which derived from congressional dissatisfaction
with the perceived tendency of some agencies to substitute expert
intuitions, based on bits and pieces of evidence, for a fair ap-
praisal of the evidence as a whole. See Universal Camera Corp. V.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), and the discussion in Jaffe, supra, 69





For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court
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